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  2. File:Diagram for part three of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ...

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  3. Arrow's impossibility theorem - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow's_impossibility_theorem

    Condorcet's example is already enough to see the impossibility of a fair ranked voting system, given stronger conditions for fairness than Arrow's theorem assumes. [20] Suppose we have three candidates ( A {\displaystyle A} , B {\displaystyle B} , and C {\displaystyle C} ) and three voters whose preferences are as follows:

  4. File:Diagram for part one of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.svg

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Diagram_for_part_one...

    English: This diagram accompanies part one of the proof Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It illustrates the process of successively moving one candidate from the bottom to the top of ballots. It illustrates the process of successively moving one candidate from the bottom to the top of ballots.

  5. File:Diagram for part two of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem.svg

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  6. Voting criteria - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voting_criteria

    In social choice theory, unrestricted domain, or universality, is a property of social welfare functions in which all preferences of all voters (but no other considerations) are allowed. Intuitively, unrestricted domain is a common requirement for social choice functions, and is a condition for Arrow's impossibility theorem.

  7. Social Choice and Individual Values - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Choice_and...

    The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible ...

  8. Comparison of voting rules - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_voting_rules

    A Canadian example of such an opportunity is seen in the City of Edmonton (Canada), which went from first-past-the-post voting in 1917 Alberta general election to five-member plurality block voting in 1921 Alberta general election, to five-member single transferable voting in 1926 Alberta general election, then to FPTP again in 1959 Alberta ...

  9. Social welfare function - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_welfare_function

    Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a rational (non-self-contradictory) decision procedure for consumers based only on ordinal preferences, it is impossible to do the same in the social choice setting ...