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A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction is a type of sealed-bid auction of multiple items. Bidders submit bids that report their valuations for the items, without knowing the bids of the other bidders. The auction system assigns the items in a socially optimal manner: it charges each individual the harm they cause to other bidders. [1]
A first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSBA) is a common type of auction. It is also known as blind auction. [1] In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids so that no bidder knows the bid of any other participant. The highest bidder pays the price that was submitted. [2]: p2 [3]
For simplicity we look for SBNE in which each bidder bids times his/her signal: Xenia bids and Yakov bids . We try to find the value of r {\displaystyle r} in each case. In a sealed-bid second-price auction , there is a SBNE with r = 1 {\displaystyle r=1} , i.e., each bidder bids exactly his/her signal.
Bidding patterns exhibited a characteristic saw-tooth pattern, [2] and the mechanism need not possess a (pure) Nash equilibrium. [1] These deficiencies lead to the replacement of the GFP mechanism in practice, and the adoption of alternate auction designs.
A Vickrey auction or sealed-bid second-price auction (SBSPA) is a type of sealed-bid auction. Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins but the price paid is the second-highest bid.
The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on.
Second-price sealed-bid auctions (Vickrey auctions) which are the same as first-price sealed-bid auctions except that the winner pays a price equal to the second-highest bid. The logic of this auction type is that the dominant strategy for all bidders is to bid their true valuation. [10]
FAR Part 14 details the requirements for conducting a "sealed bid" tender, where federal requirements can be stated "clearly, accurately, and completely" and price is the only determinant of contract awardee. [25] Under this part, Unnecessarily restrictive specifications or requirements that might unduly limit the number of bidders are prohibited.