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Since an OCSP response has less data to parse, the client-side libraries that handle it can be less complex than those that handle CRLs. [11] OCSP discloses to the responder that a particular network host used a particular certificate at a particular time. OCSP does not mandate encryption, so other parties may intercept this information. [2]
As of Firefox 28, Mozilla has announced they are deprecating CRL in favour of OCSP. [4] CRL files may grow quite large over time e.g. in US government, for certain institution multiple megabytes. Therefore, incremental CRLs have been designed [14] sometimes referred to as "delta CRLs". However, only a few clients implement them. [15]
A typical OCSP response is less than 1 kB. [31] OCSP suffers from scalability issues. It relies on the client having network access at the time of checking the certificate's revocation status; further, the OCSP responder must be accessible and produce usable responses, or else the check will fail and the client must choose between failing-soft ...
The revision DTLS 1.2 based on TLS 1.2 was published in January 2012. [33] TLS 1.3 (2018) specified in RFC 8446 includes major optimizations and security improvements. QUIC (2021) specified in RFC 9000 and DTLS 1.3 (2022) specified in RFC 9147 builds on TLS 1.3. The publishing of TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.3 obsoleted TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2.
Their use doesn't involve the problems of trusting third parties that may improperly sign certificates. Self-signed certificate transactions usually present a far smaller attack surface by eliminating both the complex certificate chain validation, [1] and certificate revocation checks like CRL and OCSP.
Worldwide, the certificate authority business is fragmented, with national or regional providers dominating their home market. This is because many uses of digital certificates, such as for legally binding digital signatures, are linked to local law, regulations, and accreditation schemes for certificate authorities.
It must be continuously updated with current CRL information from a certificate authority which issued the certificates contained within the CRL. While this is a potentially labor-intensive process, the use of a dedicated validation authority allows for dynamic validation of certificates issued by an offline root certificate authority .
X.509 and RFC 5280 also include standards for certificate revocation list (CRL) implementations. Another IETF-approved way of checking a certificate's validity is the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Firefox 3.0 enabled OCSP checking by default, as did versions of Windows from at least Vista and later. [9]