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If any check fails on any certificate, the algorithm terminates and path validation fails. (This is an explanatory summary of the scope of the algorithm, not a rigorous reproduction of the detailed steps.) The public key algorithm and parameters are checked; The current date/time is checked against the validity period of the certificate;
JWS request authorization has changed; The "resource" field of JWS request bodies is replaced by a new JWS header: "url" Directory endpoint/resource renaming; URI → URL renaming in challenge resources; Account creation and ToS agreement are combined into one step. Previously, these were two steps. A new challenge type was implemented, TLS ...
The certificate used must match the TLSA record, and it must also pass PKIX certification path validation to a trusted root-CA. A value of 2 is for what is commonly called trust anchor assertion (and DANE-TA). The TLSA record matches the certificate of the root CA, or one of the intermediate CAs, of the certificate in use by the service.
Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) is a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension that allows the application layer to negotiate which protocol should be performed over a secure connection in a manner that avoids additional round trips and which is independent of the application-layer protocols.
The Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) is an Internet protocol standardized by the IETF used for obtaining X.509 digital certificates in a public key infrastructure (PKI). CMP is a very feature-rich and flexible protocol, supporting many types of cryptography.
EJBCA (formerly: Enterprise JavaBeans Certificate Authority) is a free software public key infrastructure (PKI) certificate authority software package maintained and sponsored by the Swedish for-profit company PrimeKey Solutions AB, which holds the copyright to most of the codebase, being a subsidiary for Keyfactor Inc. based in United States.
CRVs are expected to be small enough to enable push-based checking, but more constrained clients may still perform pull-based checks, only accessing select CRVs, or deferring retrieval of CRVs until certificate validation. [43] A client using Let's Revoke with push-based checking is able to fail-hard for any certificate with a revocation number ...
Alice and Bob have public key certificates issued by Carol, the certificate authority (CA). Alice wishes to perform a transaction with Bob and sends him her public key certificate. Bob, concerned that Alice's private key may have been compromised, creates an 'OCSP request' that contains Alice's certificate serial number and sends it to Carol.