Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
HMAC-SHA1 generation. In cryptography, an HMAC (sometimes expanded as either keyed-hash message authentication code or hash-based message authentication code) is a specific type of message authentication code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function and a secret cryptographic key.
HMAC-based one-time password (HOTP) is a one-time password (OTP) algorithm based on HMAC. It is a cornerstone of the Initiative for Open Authentication (OATH). HOTP was published as an informational IETF RFC 4226 in December 2005, documenting the algorithm along with a Java implementation.
MAC algorithms can be constructed from other cryptographic primitives, like cryptographic hash functions (as in the case of HMAC) or from block cipher algorithms (OMAC, CCM, GCM, and PMAC). However many of the fastest MAC algorithms, like UMAC-VMAC and Poly1305-AES, are constructed based on universal hashing. [8]
HKDF is a simple key derivation function (KDF) based on the HMAC message authentication code. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] It was initially proposed by its authors as a building block in various protocols and applications, as well as to discourage the proliferation of multiple KDF mechanisms. [ 2 ]
PBKDF2 has five input parameters: [9] DK = PBKDF2(PRF, Password, Salt, c, dkLen) where: PRF is a pseudorandom function of two parameters with output length hLen (e.g., a keyed HMAC)
As an extension of the HMAC-based one-time password algorithm (HOTP), it has been adopted as Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard RFC 6238. [1] TOTP is the cornerstone of Initiative for Open Authentication (OATH) and is used in a number of two-factor authentication [1] (2FA) systems.
The paper proving the security of Hash_DRBG and HMAC_DRBG does cite the attempted security proof for Dual_EC_DRBG used in the previous paragraph as a security proof to say that one should not use CTR_DRBG because it is the only DRBG in NIST SP 800-90A that lacks a security proof. [14] HMAC_DRBG also has a machine-verified security proof. [15]
The HMAC is calculated over the packet payload and material from the packet header, including the packet sequence number. To protect against replay attacks , the receiver maintains the sequence numbers of previously received messages, compares them with the sequence number in each new received message and admits the new message only if it has ...