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In moral philosophy, instrumental and intrinsic value are the distinction between what is a means to an end and what is as an end in itself. [1] Things are deemed to have instrumental value (or extrinsic value [2]) if they help one achieve a particular end; intrinsic values, by contrast, are understood to be desirable in and of themselves.
Intrinsic value is in contrast to instrumental value (also known as extrinsic value), which is a property of anything that derives its value from a relation to another intrinsically valuable thing. [1] Intrinsic value is always something that an object has "in itself" or "for its own sake", and is an intrinsic property.
Instrumental values can form chains with intrinsic values as their end points. A thing has intrinsic or final value if it is good in itself or good for its own sake. This means that it is good independent of external factors or outcomes. A thing has extrinsic or instrumental value if it is useful or leads to other good things.
An intrinsically valuable thing is worth for itself, not as a means to something else. It is giving value intrinsic and extrinsic properties. An ethic good with instrumental value may be termed an ethic mean, and an ethic good with intrinsic value may be termed an end-in-itself. An object may be both a mean and end-in-itself.
Sen relabeled instrumental and value rationality by naming their traditional defects. Weber's value-rationality became "process-independent" reasoning. It ignores instrumental means as it judges intended consequences: "the goodness of outcomes" always valuable in themselves. Its use produces fact-free intrinsically good knowledge.
As a scientist, Weber did not judge disenchantment. But he continued to believe that instrumental means are neither legitimate nor workable without value-rational ends. Even apparently impersonal scientific inquiry, he argued, depends on intrinsic value-rational beliefs as much as does religion.
Love, beauty and friendship are intrinsic values (i.e. good in themselves) rather than instrumental values, and they do not lead in all cases necessarily either to pleasure or happiness. [34] Another significant writer on value, mentioned by both Frankena and Zimmerman, is John Dewey who questioned whether intrinsic values exist at all. All ...
Intrinsic value is considered self-ascribed, all animals have it, unlike instrumental or extrinsic values. Instrumental value is the value that others confer on an animal (or on any other entity) because of its value as a resource (e.g. as property, labour, food, fibre, " ecosystem services ") or as a source of emotional, recreational ...