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It is the negation of material implication. That is to say that for any two propositions P {\displaystyle P} and Q {\displaystyle Q} , the material nonimplication from P {\displaystyle P} to Q {\displaystyle Q} is true if and only if the negation of the material implication from P {\displaystyle P} to Q {\displaystyle Q} is true.
The material conditional (also known as material implication) is an operation commonly used in logic. When the conditional symbol → {\displaystyle \rightarrow } is interpreted as material implication, a formula P → Q {\displaystyle P\rightarrow Q} is true unless P {\displaystyle P} is true and Q {\displaystyle Q} is false.
In propositional logic, material implication [1] [2] is a valid rule of replacement that allows a conditional statement to be replaced by a disjunction in which the antecedent is negated. The rule states that P implies Q is logically equivalent to not- P {\displaystyle P} or Q {\displaystyle Q} and that either form can replace the other in ...
Other languages express disjunctive meanings in a variety of ways, though it is unknown whether disjunction itself is a linguistic universal. In many languages such as Dyirbal and Maricopa, disjunction is marked using a verb suffix. For instance, in the Maricopa example below, disjunction is marked by the suffix šaa. [1]
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14, OR, Logical disjunction; 15, true, Tautology. Each logic operator can be used in an assertion about variables and operations, showing a basic rule of inference. Examples: The column-14 operator (OR), shows Addition rule: when p=T (the hypothesis selects the first two lines of the table), we see (at column-14) that p∨q=T.
Related puzzles involving disjunction include free choice inferences, Hurford's Constraint, and the contribution of disjunction in alternative questions. Other apparent discrepancies between natural language and classical logic include the paradoxes of material implication, donkey anaphora and the problem of counterfactual conditionals.
The Łukasiewicz Ł3 has the same tables for AND, OR, and NOT as the Kleene logic given above, but differs in its definition of implication in that "unknown implies unknown" is true. This section follows the presentation from Malinowski's chapter of the Handbook of the History of Logic , vol 8.