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  2. Robert Aumann - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Aumann

    Robert John Aumann (Hebrew name: ישראל אומן, Yisrael Aumann; born June 8, 1930) is an Israeli-American mathematician, and a member of the United States National Academy of Sciences. He is a professor at the Center for the Study of Rationality in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in Israel.

  3. Highest and best use - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Highest_and_best_use

    For example, assume that "House B" has a value as a house of $200,000, and a site value as a commercial lot of $250,000 with a cost to demolish the house and prepare the site at $25,000. The highest and best use of the site is to demolish the house and sell the site as a commercial lot.

  4. Auction theory - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Auction_theory

    Auction theory is a branch of applied economics that deals with how bidders act in auctions and researches how the features of auctions incentivise predictable outcomes. Auction theory is a tool used to inform the design of real-world auctions. Sellers use auction theory to raise higher revenues while allowing buyers to procure at a lower cost.

  5. Aumann's agreement theorem - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aumann's_agreement_theorem

    The impossibility of agreeing to disagree, in Aumann's theorem, is a necessary condition for the existence of a common prior. A stronger condition can be formulated in terms of bets. A bet is a set of random variables f a {\displaystyle f_{a}} , one for each agent a {\displaystyle a} , such the ∑ a f a = 0 {\displaystyle \sum _{a}f_{a}=0} .

  6. Revenue equivalence - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revenue_equivalence

    A classic example is the pair of auction mechanisms: first price auction and second price auction. First-price auction has a variant which is Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible; second-price auction is dominant-strategy-incentive-compatible, which is even stronger than Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible. The two mechanisms fulfill the ...

  7. Generalized second-price auction - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generalized_second-price...

    The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on.

  8. highline.huffingtonpost.com

    highline.huffingtonpost.com/.../8/int-41.pdf

    Created Date: 9/18/2015 10:56:43 PM

  9. Gross substitutes - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_substitutes

    I.e., an increase in the price of one commodity causes people to want strictly more of the other commodity, since the commodities can substitute each other (bus and taxi are a common example). In auction theory and competitive equilibrium theory, a valuation function is said to have the gross substitutes (GS) property if for all pairs of ...