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The protoself is an unconscious process that creates a "map" of the body's physiological state, which is then used by the brain to generate conscious experience. This "map" is constantly updated as the brain receives new stimuli from the body, and it forms the foundation for the development of more complex forms of consciousness.
In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness. [1] In particular, he said GWT provided a promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that "now the question arises in a different ...
The information integration theory of consciousness (IITC) shares with the DCH the idea that conscious experiences provide informative discriminations among a vast repertoire of possible experiences. In the IITC, the quantity phi is defined as the information that is integrated across the informational "weakest link" of a system.
The experience of a colour can be profound, but it doesn't really exist other than in our minds. Consciousness: how can I experience things that aren't 'real'? Skip to main content
Max Velmans proposed that the "everyday understanding of consciousness" uncontroversially "refers to experience itself rather than any particular thing that we observe or experience" and he added that consciousness "is [therefore] exemplified by all the things that we observe or experience", [31]: 4 whether thoughts, feelings, or perceptions.
Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch OR) is a highly controversial theory postulating that consciousness originates at the quantum level inside neurons (rather than being a product of neural connections). The mechanism is held to be a quantum process called objective reduction that is orchestrated by cellular structures called microtubules.
J. W. Dalton has criticized the global workspace theory on the grounds that it provides, at best, an account of the cognitive function of consciousness, and fails even to address the deeper problem of its nature, of what consciousness is, and of how any mental process whatsoever can be conscious: the hard problem of consciousness. [14] A. C.
He took the view that the contents of consciousness are usually about something, and this is described as intentionality or meaning. He suggested that intentionality is another aspect of the "binding problem", as to how the different modalities, such as sight and hearing, are bound together into a single conscious experience. Gray argued that ...