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McIntosh, [a] 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), also written M‘Intosh, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans. As the facts were recited by Chief Justice John Marshall , the successor in interest to a private purchase from the Piankeshaw attempted to ...
The discovery doctrine was expounded by the United States Supreme Court in a series of decisions, most notably Johnson v. McIntosh in 1823. In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall held that under generally accepted principles of international law:
The case of Johnson v. McIntosh by the Supreme Court in 1823 is well known to most law students as declaring that Indian tribes had the right to occupy the land but only the United States held title to the land by right of discovery. It covers other major cases, including Cherokee Nation v.
Loyalist property forfeiture, Supreme Court review of state court judgments Laidlaw v. Organ: 15 U.S. 178 (1817) the rule of caveat emptor in a commodity delivery contract: Craig v. Radford: 16 U.S. 594 (1818) Jay Treaty protection of alien enemy defeasible estate; surveying law McCulloch v. Maryland: 17 U.S. 316 (1819) doctrine of implied ...
In the 1823 case of Johnson v. McIntosh, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision stating that Indians could occupy and control lands within the United States but could not hold title to those lands. [22] Jackson viewed the union as a federation of highly esteemed states, as was common before the American Civil War. He opposed ...
Sims' Lessee v. Irvine (1799) was the first Supreme Court decision to discuss aboriginal title (albeit briefly), and the only such decision before the Marshall Court. The Court found ejectment jurisdiction over certain lands, notwithstanding the defendant's claim (in the alternative to the claim that the defendant himself held title) that the lands were still held in aboriginal title because:
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote the Missouri Supreme Court’s reading of a state statute was “so fundamentally flawed” that it “amounted to a Fourteenth Amendment ...
The Supreme Court vacated this order and remanded the case for further review, finding that a burden of a retrial three decades after the crime "should not be imposed unless each ground supporting the state court decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996]."