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David Malet Armstrong AO FAHA (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014), [4] often D. M. Armstrong, was an Australian philosopher.He is well known for his work on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and for his defence of a factualist ontology, a functionalist theory of the mind, an externalist epistemology, and a necessitarian conception of the laws of nature.
It is implied that one could test for consciousness using a similar method. Further illustrating his idea, Armstrong gives an analogy in which perception is a key to a door, the door being action. The unlocking of the door, and therefore action, is optional, but one cannot open the door without the key. A blind man, for instance, lacks certain ...
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The universe is described by this school as one created by purusa-prakášti entities infused with various permutations and combinations of variously enumerated elements, senses, feelings, activity and mind. [19] During the state of imbalance, one of more constituents overwhelm the others, creating a form of bondage, particularly of the mind.
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Despite this diversity of views, there is broad agreement concerning most objects as to whether they are abstract or concrete, [1] such that most interpretations agree, for example, that rocks are concrete objects while numbers are abstract objects. Abstract objects are most commonly used in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, and semantics.
On Ideas gives greater detail to many of the arguments which Aristotle recounts in Metaphysics A.9. [1] There and here objections to arguments for Plato's Theory of Forms are given. A point made in multiple places is that the Platonist arguments establish only that there are universals in a general and metaphysically slim sense, and not there ...
As D.M. Armstrong notes, this distinction between analytic ontology and speculative cosmology is a division within metaphysics. [14] As such, ontology does not exhaust metaphysics. Because Williams is an empiricist he thinks science can inform metaphysics, especially cosmology, as characterised above.