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The philosophy of language presented in the Tractatus attempts to demonstrate just what the limits of language are – to delineate precisely what can and cannot be sensically said. Among the sensibly sayable for Wittgenstein are the propositions of natural science, and to the nonsensical, or unsayable, those subjects associated with philosophy ...
Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a 1982 book by philosopher of language Saul Kripke in which he contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations centers on a skeptical rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of our ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that ...
A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven. Wittgenstein argued that a word or even a sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played.
Pages in category "Books by Ludwig Wittgenstein" The following 11 pages are in this category, out of 11 total. This list may not reflect recent changes. B.
Wittgenstein lists the following as examples of language-games: "Giving orders, and obeying them"; "describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements"; "constructing an object from a description (a drawing)"; "reporting an event"; "speculating about an event". [5] The famous example is the meaning of the word "game".
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ ˈ v ɪ t ɡ ən ʃ t aɪ n,-s t aɪ n / VIT-gən-s(h)tyne; [7] Austrian German: [ˈluːdvɪk ˈjoːsɛf ˈjoːhan ˈvɪtɡn̩ʃtaɪn]; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
It is not sufficient here, however, for the language to simply be one that has not yet been translated. In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. [4]
For example, the "understanding" of a language may come about by the "drilling" of the association between the word "yellow" and a yellow-patch; or it may involve learning rules, like rules used in the game of chess. Moreover, Wittgenstein doesn't think that humans use language mechanically, as if following a calculus.