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A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology.
By invoking the fallacy, the contested issue of lying is ignored (cf. whataboutism). The tu quoque fallacy is a specific type of "two wrongs make a right". Accusing another of not practicing what they preach , while appropriate in some situations, [ a ] does not in itself invalidate an action or statement that is perceived as contradictory.
Naturalistic fallacy fallacy is a type of argument from fallacy. Straw man fallacy – refuting an argument different from the one actually under discussion, while not recognizing or acknowledging the distinction. [110] Texas sharpshooter fallacy – improperly asserting a cause to explain a cluster of data. [111]
The moralistic fallacy is the informal fallacy of assuming that an aspect of nature which has socially unpleasant consequences cannot exist. Its typical form is "if X were true, then Z would happen!
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Boudry coined the term fallacy fork. [27] For a given fallacy, one must either characterize it by means of a deductive argumentation scheme, which rarely applies (the first prong of the fork), or one must relax definitions and add nuance to take the actual intent and context of the argument into account (the other prong of the fork). [27]
Escalation of commitment, irrational escalation, or sunk cost fallacy, where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. G. I. Joe fallacy, the tendency to think that knowing about cognitive bias is enough to overcome it. [65]
Moral relativism or ethical relativism (often reformulated as relativist ethics or relativist morality) is used to describe several philosophical positions concerned with the differences in moral judgments across different peoples and cultures. An advocate of such ideas is often referred to as a relativist.