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Gettier's examples hinged on instances of epistemic luck: cases where a person appears to have sound evidence for a proposition, and that proposition is in fact true, but the apparent evidence is not causally related to the proposition's truth. In response to Gettier's article, numerous philosophers [3] have offered modified criteria for ...
The Gettier problem, in the field of epistemology, is a landmark philosophical problem concerning the understanding of descriptive knowledge.Attributed to American philosopher Edmund Gettier, Gettier-type counterexamples (called "Gettier-cases") challenge the long-held justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge.
Edmund Lee Gettier III (/ ˈ ɡ ɛ t i ər /; October 31, 1927 – March 23, 2021) was an American philosopher at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.He is best known for his article written in 1963: "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", [1] which has generated an extensive philosophical literature trying to respond to what became known as the Gettier problem.
Most Gettier-type-problems (like Gettier's case 1) typically conflate the sense-reference distinction. The flaw is that the element of "true" in the "justified, true belief" formula is typically missing because the referent of belief shifts in these sorts of "problems". Take Gettier's case 1: the referent of "the man" is always Jones, not Smith.
He also put forward an epistemological system which attempted to deal with both the Gettier problem and those posed by skepticism. This highly influential argument eschewed justification as a necessary requirement for knowledge. [21]: ch. 7 Nozick gives four conditions for S's knowing that P (S=Subject / P=Proposition): P is true; S believes that P
Neutral monism is an umbrella term for a class of metaphysical theories in the philosophy of mind, concerning the relation of mind to matter.These theories take the fundamental nature of reality to be neither mental nor physical; in other words it is "neutral".
The ancient Greek δείκνυμι, deiknymi, 'thought experiment', "was the most ancient pattern of mathematical proof", and existed before Euclidean mathematics, [7] where the emphasis was on the conceptual, rather than on the experimental part of a thought experiment.
David John Chalmers (/ ˈ tʃ ɑː l m ər z /; born 20 April 1966) [1] is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.