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In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom proposed the simulation argument, which suggests that if a civilization becomes capable of creating conscious simulations, it could generate so many simulated beings that a randomly chosen conscious entity would almost certainly be in a simulation.
One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma. This objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane. [7] [8] [9] The two-horned dilemma focuses on the connection between the agent's inclination and the agent's decision. This connection can be either ...
The argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, [4] which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information-processing system operating on formal symbols, and that simulation of a given mental state is sufficient for its presence.
The most common objection to naïve Coherentism is that it relies on the idea that circular justification is acceptable. In this view, P ultimately supports P, begging the question. Coherentists reply that it is not just P that is supporting P, but P along with the totality of the other statements in the whole system of belief.
Thus, the China brain possesses all the elements of a functional description of mind: sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and internal mental states causally connected to other mental states. If the nation of China can be made to act in this way, then, according to functionalism, this system would have a mind.
(Reuters) -The U.S. Department of Justice announced a lawsuit on Wednesday accusing pharmacy chain CVS of filling illegal opioid prescriptions and billing federal health insurance programs ...
Additionally, part of that balancing act requires Trump to be selective with the campaign promises he decides to implement. For example, as Newsweek noted, approximately a third of residential ...
Arguments from qualia, such as Frank Jackson's knowledge argument, can be understood as objections to computational theories of mind in this way—though they take aim at physicalist conceptions of the mind in general, and not computational theories specifically. [citation needed]