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One use of the indirect utility concept is the notion of the utility of money. The (indirect) utility function for money is a nonlinear function that is bounded and asymmetric about the origin. The utility function is concave in the positive region, representing the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility. The boundedness represents the fact ...
In economics, random utility theory was then developed by Daniel McFadden [5] and in mathematical psychology primarily by Duncan Luce and Anthony Marley. [6] In essence, choice modelling assumes that the utility (benefit, or value) that an individual derives from item A over item B is a function of the frequency that (s)he chooses item A over ...
In decision theory, subjective expected utility is the attractiveness of an economic opportunity as perceived by a decision-maker in the presence of risk.Characterizing the behavior of decision-makers as using subjective expected utility was promoted and axiomatized by L. J. Savage in 1954 [1] [2] following previous work by Ramsey and von Neumann. [3]
In decision theory, the von Neumann–Morgenstern (VNM) utility theorem demonstrates that rational choice under uncertainty involves making decisions that take the form of maximizing the expected value of some cardinal utility function. This function is known as the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function.
In mental accounting theory, the framing effect defines that the way a person subjectively frames a transaction in their mind will determine the utility they receive or expect. [11] The concept of framing is adopted in prospect theory , which is commonly used by mental accounting theorists as the value function in their analysis (Richard Thaler ...
When goods are indivisible, a coalitional game can be set up so that a utility function can be defined on all subsets of the goods. Hu (2020) [27] shows the endowment effect when the utility function is superadditive, i.e., the value of the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Hu (2020) also introduces a few unbiased solutions which ...
In decision theory, the Ellsberg paradox (or Ellsberg's paradox) is a paradox in which people's decisions are inconsistent with subjective expected utility theory. John Maynard Keynes published a version of the paradox in 1921. [1] Daniel Ellsberg popularized the paradox in his 1961 paper, "Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms". [2]
The utility function u(c) is defined only up to positive affine transformation – in other words, a constant could be added to the value of u(c) for all c, and/or u(c) could be multiplied by a positive constant factor, without affecting the conclusions. An agent is risk-averse if and only if the utility function is concave.