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Cheap talk can, in general, be added to any game and has the potential to enhance the set of possible equilibrium outcomes. For example, one can add a round of cheap talk in the beginning of the Battle of the Sexes. Each player announces whether they intend to go to the football game, or the opera.
In economic theory, the Wilson doctrine (or Wilson critique) stipulates that game theory should not rely excessively on common knowledge assumptions. Most prominently, it is interpreted as a request for institutional designs to be "detail-free". [1]
Transferable utility is a concept in cooperative game theory and in economics. Utility is transferable if one player can losslessly transfer part of its utility to another player. Such transfers are possible if the players have a common currency that is valued equally by all.
A prototypical paper on game theory in economics begins by presenting a game that is an abstraction of a particular economic situation. One or more solution concepts are chosen, and the author demonstrates which strategy sets in the presented game are equilibria of the appropriate type.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, published in 1944 [1] by Princeton University Press, is a book by mathematician John von Neumann and economist Oskar Morgenstern which is considered the groundbreaking text that created the interdisciplinary research field of game theory.
In economics and game theory, complete information is an economic situation or game in which knowledge about other market participants or players is available to all participants. The utility functions (including risk aversion), payoffs, strategies and "types" of players are thus common knowledge .
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Global coordination games belong to a subfield of game theory which gained momentum with the article by Morris and Shin (1998). Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin considered a stylized currency crises model, in which traders observe the relevant fundamentals with small noise, and show that this leads to the selection of a unique equilibrium.