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Two-level game theory is a political model, derived from game theory, that illustrates the domestic-international interactions between states. It was originally introduced in 1988 by Robert D. Putnam in his publication "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games".
Separately, game theory has played a role in online algorithms; in particular, the k-server problem, which has in the past been referred to as games with moving costs and request-answer games. [125] Yao's principle is a game-theoretic technique for proving lower bounds on the computational complexity of randomized algorithms , especially online ...
Sequential game: A game is sequential if one player performs their actions after another player; otherwise, the game is a simultaneous move game. Perfect information : A game has perfect information if it is a sequential game and every player knows the strategies chosen by the players who preceded them.
Putnam developed the influential two-level game theory that assumes international agreements will only be successfully brokered if they also result in domestic benefits. His most famous work, Bowling Alone , argues that the United States has undergone an unprecedented collapse in civic, social, associational, and political life ( social capital ...
The Guess 2/3 of the average game shows the level-n theory in practice. In this game, players are tasked with guessing an integer from 0 to 100 inclusive which they believe is closest to 2/3 of the average of all players’ guesses. A Nash equilibrium can be found by thinking through each level: Level 0: The average can be in [0, 100]
In game theory, a Bayesian game is a strategic decision-making model which assumes players have incomplete information. Players may hold private information relevant to the game, meaning that the payoffs are not common knowledge. [1] Bayesian games model the outcome of player interactions using aspects of Bayesian probability.
John Harsanyi – equilibrium theory (Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1994) Monika Henzinger – algorithmic game theory and information retrieval; John Hicks – general equilibrium theory (including Kaldor–Hicks efficiency) Naira Hovakimyan – differential games and adaptive control; Peter L. Hurd – evolution of aggressive ...
Conditions on G (the stage game) – whether there are any technical conditions that should hold in the one-shot game in order for the theorem to work. Conditions on x (the target payoff vector of the repeated game) – whether the theorem works for any individually rational and feasible payoff vector, or only on a subset of these vectors.