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The flexible nature of DO-178C's processes and entry/exit criteria make it difficult to implement the first time, because these aspects are abstract and there is no "base set" of activities from which to work. The intention of DO-178C was not to be prescriptive. There are many possible and acceptable ways for a real project to define these aspects.
The earliest revisions of the Advisory Circular were brief, serving little more than to call attention to active DO-178 revisions. The Advisory Circular revisions C and D are considerably longer, giving guidance in modifying and re-using software previously approved using DO-178, DO-178A, or DO-178B (preceding revisions of the DO-178 standard).
These position papers were among the inputs to the joint RTCA/EUROCAE committee that developed DO-178C, DO-278A, DO-248C, and DO-330, and the technology supplements to these publications (DO-331, DO-332, and DO-333). [1] The model for international certification authority harmonization has changed since CAST's inception. [5]
DO-178C and DO-254 define the design assurance objectives that must be accomplished for given DAL. Unlike SIL, it is the case that both ASIL and DAL are statements measuring degree of hazard. DAL E is the ARP4754 equivalent of QM; in both classifications hazards are negligible and safety management is not required.
Various standards suggest different levels, e.g. Software Levels A-E in DO-178C, [4] SIL (Safety Integrity Level) 1-4 in IEC 61508, [1] ASIL (Automotive Safety Integrity Level) A-D in ISO 26262. [2] The assignment is typically done in the context of an overarching system, where the worst case consequences of software failures are investigated.
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The DO-254/ED-80 standard is the counterpart to the well-established software standard RTCA DO-178C/EUROCAE ED-12C. With DO-254/ED-80, the certification authorities have indicated that avionics equipment contains both hardware and software, and each is critical to safe operation of aircraft.
It is a misunderstanding that by purely syntactic rearrangements of decisions (breaking them into several independently evaluated conditions using temporary variables, the values of which are then used in the decision) which do not change the semantics of a program can lower the difficulty of obtaining complete MC/DC coverage. [5]