Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Cournot's model of competition is typically presented for the case of a duopoly market structure; the following example provides a straightforward analysis of the Cournot model for the case of Duopoly. Therefore, suppose we have a market consisting of only two firms which we will call firm 1 and firm 2.
A Cournot duopoly is a model of strategic interaction between two firms where they simultaneously choose their output levels, assuming the rival's output level is fixed. The firms compete on quantity, and each firm attempts to maximize its profit given the other firm's output level.
Cournot quantity competition, one of the first models of oligopoly markets was developed by Augustin Cournot in 1835. In Cournot’s model, there are two firms and each firm selects a quantity to produce, and the resulting total output determines the market price. [9] Bertrand Price Competition, Joseph Bertrand was the first to analyze this ...
This was a point first raised by Francis Edgeworth [5] and gave rise to the Bertrand–Edgeworth model. Integer pricing. Prices higher than MC are ruled out because one firm can undercut another by an arbitrarily small amount. If prices are discrete (for example have to take integer values) then one firm has to undercut the other by at least ...
Competition is well defined through the Cournot's model because, when there are infinite many firms in the market, the excess of price over marginal cost will approach to zero. [4] A duopoly is a special form of oligopoly where the market is made up of only two firms.
The accuracy of the predictions of each model will vary from industry to industry, depending on the closeness of each model to the industry situation. If capacity and output can be easily changed, Bertrand is generally a better model of duopoly competition. If output and capacity are difficult to adjust, then Cournot is generally a better model.
The Cournot duopoly model developed in his book also introduced the concept of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, the reaction function and best-response dynamics. Cournot believed that economists must utilize the tools of mathematics only to establish probable limits and to express less stable facts in more absolute terms.
Non-cooperative games have a long history, beginning with Cournot's duopoly model. A 1994 Nobel Laureate for Economic Sciences, John Nash, [7] proved a general-existence theorem for non-cooperative games, which moves beyond simple zero-sum games. This theory was generalized by Vickrey (1961) to deal with the unobservable value of each buyer.