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Hume's fork is the idea that all items of knowledge are based either on logic and definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then "ought" statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and non-cognitivism work with such conclusions.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume. [3] The terms are often used interchangeably, though philosophical discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics.
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
They further argue that political fact-checking focuses exclusively on describing facts over making moral judgments (ex., the is–ought problem), assert that it relies on public reason to attempt to discredit public figures, and question its effectiveness on conspiracy theories or fascism.
The problem of the missing shade of blue arises because just two paragraphs later Hume seems to provide just such an idea. He says: He says: There is, however, one contradictory phenomenon, which may prove, that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise, independent of their correspondent impressions.
Here Hume tackles the problem of how liberty may be reconciled with metaphysical necessity (otherwise known as a compatibilist formulation of free will). Hume believes that all disputes on the subject have been merely verbal arguments—that is to say, arguments which are based on a lack of prior agreement on definitions.
The problem is similar with respect to the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Discussing the is-ought problem it is agreed that facts about how persons ought to act are not entailed by natural facts but cannot vary unless natural facts vary, and this rigid binding without entailment might seem puzzling.
"The is–ought problem, as articulated by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume, arises when one makes claims about what ought to be that are based solely on statements about what is." I find this conclusion absurd. A basic moral truth has to exist but nowhere does anyone specify it has to belong in the empirical domains of reality.