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The prisoner's dilemma models many real-world situations involving strategic behavior. In casual usage, the label "prisoner's dilemma" is applied to any situation in which two entities can gain important benefits by cooperating or suffer by failing to do so, but find it difficult or expensive to coordinate their choices.
The prisoner's dilemma model is crucial to understanding the collective problem because it illustrates the consequences of individual interests that conflict with the interests of the group. In simple models such as this one, the problem would have been solved had the two prisoners been able to communicate.
Three prisoners, A, B, and C, are in separate cells and sentenced to death. The governor has selected one of them at random to be pardoned. The warden knows which one is pardoned, but is not allowed to tell. Prisoner A begs the warden to let him know the identity of one of the two who are going to be executed. "If B is to be pardoned, give me C ...
The ideal solution is then to undertake this as a collective action, the cost of which is shared. Situations like this include the prisoner's dilemma, a collective action problem in which no communication is allowed, the free rider problem, and the tragedy of the commons, also known as the problem with open access. [12]
The Prisoners' Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0521899475. Lacey, Nicola (2008). Women, Crime, and Character From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D'Urbervilles. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199544363. Lacey, Nicola (2016).
Kuhn has written extensively on the prisoner's dilemma. In his article 'Pure and Utilitarian Prisoner's dilemmas', [3] he distinguishes between a 'pure' prisoner's dilemma and an impure prisoner's dilemma. A "pure dilemma" is defined when no mixed strategies improve outcomes over mutual cooperation; it's an "impure dilemma" when such strategies ...
To avoid the worst-case outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma, though, the company has hedged its bets. It seeks out fellow corporate climate leaders and sells them on its new CO2-light products.
Tit-for-tat has been very successfully used as a strategy for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The strategy was first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in Robert Axelrod's two tournaments, [3] held around 1980. Notably, it was (on both occasions) both the simplest strategy and the most successful in direct competition.