Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
There is a debate over whether the argument from ignorance is always fallacious. It is generally accepted that there are only special circumstances in which this argument may not be fallacious. For example, with the presumption of innocence in legal cases, it would make sense to argue: [5] It has not been proven that the defendant is guilty.
The description of the fallacy in this form is attributed to British philosopher Antony Flew, who wrote, in his 1966 book God & Philosophy, . In this ungracious move a brash generalization, such as No Scotsmen put sugar on their porridge, when faced with falsifying facts, is transformed while you wait into an impotent tautology: if ostensible Scotsmen put sugar on their porridge, then this is ...
Proving too much – an argument that results in an overly generalized conclusion (e.g.: arguing that drinking alcohol is bad because in some instances it has led to spousal or child abuse). Psychologist's fallacy – an observer presupposes the objectivity of their own perspective when analyzing a behavioral event.
For example, tightly connected networks may be used to represent echo chambers. This theory is useful for devising countermeasures to misinformation on a social media platform level, such as down ranking or removing posts and enabling forwarding restriction policies on suspicious users.
This explains, for example, why arguments that are accidentally valid are still somehow flawed: because the arguer himself lacks a good reason to believe the conclusion. [ 9 ] The fallacy of begging the question , on this perspective, is a fallacy because it fails to expand our knowledge by providing independent justification for its conclusion.
For example, Scott recommends telling a child to spit out the chewing gum once it’s lost the original flavor. This will provide them with a more concrete time frame on when to stop chewing gum ...
The three kleshas of ignorance, attachment and aversion are referred to as the three poisons (Skt. triviṣa; Tibetan: dug gsum) in the Mahayana tradition and as the three unwholesome roots (Pāli, akusala-mūla; Skt. akuśala-mūla) in the Theravada tradition. The Sanskrit, Pali, and Tibetan terms for each of the three poisons are as follows:
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."