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Download as PDF; Printable version; ... These are the articles about different bidding strategies for auctions. Pages in category "Bidding strategy"
Online auctions often use an equivalent version of Vickrey's second-price auction wherein bidders provide proxy bids for items. A proxy bid is an amount an individual values some item at. The online auction house will bid up the price of the item until the proxy bid for the winner is at the top.
An auction algorithm has been used in a business setting to determine the best prices on a set of products offered to multiple buyers. It is an iterative procedure, so the name "auction algorithm" is related to a sales auction, where multiple bids are compared to determine the best offer, with the final sales going to the highest bidders.
An online auction (also electronic auction, e-auction, virtual auction, or eAuction) is an auction held over the internet and accessed by internet connected devices. [ 1 ] [ 2 ] [ 3 ] Similar to in-person auctions, online auctions come in a variety of types , with different bidding and selling rules.
Therefore, the bidding is going to be more dynamic. If the bid decrement is high, the bidding steps must be optimally designed to obtain the best results. There might be no ‘‘‘extension‘‘‘ of the auction if a set time is being given. In the case of an extension, the auction elongates itself for a certain time if a supplier makes a bid.
A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction is a type of sealed-bid auction of multiple items. Bidders submit bids that report their valuations for the items, without knowing the bids of the other bidders. The auction system assigns the items in a socially optimal manner: it charges each individual the harm they cause to other bidders. [1]
The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on.
Thus the strategy of bidding higher than one's true valuation is dominated by the strategy of truthfully bidding. The strategy of underbidding is also dominated by bidding truthfully. Assume that bidder bids <. If > then the bidder would lose the item with a truthful bid as well as an underbid, so the strategies have equal payoffs for this case.