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Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind–brain identity theory, and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain .
There, he became acquainted with philosophy of mind in the logical behaviorist tradition, of which Ryle was a major exponent. Although he would later abandon logical behaviorism as a theory of the mind in favor of the type-identity theory, Place nevertheless continued to harbor sympathies toward the behavioristic approach to psychology in general.
Identity theory may refer to: Any of the theories of identity in philosophy; Cultural identity theory, in the social sciences; Identity Theory, a literary website; Identity theory of mind, a philosophical term; Personal identity, the unique numerical identity of a person over time; Pure identity theory, in logic;
The philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the body and the external world. The mind–body problem is a paradigmatic issue in philosophy of mind, although a number of other issues are addressed, such as the hard problem of consciousness and the nature of particular mental states.
In the philosophy of mind, panpsychism (/ p æ n ˈ s aɪ k ɪ z əm /) is the view that the mind or a mind-like aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. [1] It is also described as a theory that "the mind is a fundamental feature of the world which exists throughout the universe". [ 2 ]
In philosophy of mind, the extended mind thesis says that the mind does not exclusively reside in the brain or even the body, but extends into the physical world. [3] The thesis proposes that some objects in the external environment can be part of a cognitive process and in that way function as extensions of the mind itself.
Using this conception of perception as a state, Armstrong characterizes consciousness as "perception or awareness of the state of our own mind", [7] or "a self-scanning system in the central nervous system". [8] He sees consciousness not as an external construct that interacts with the body and brain, but a self-aware state of the physical brain.
The theory posits that the human mind once operated in a state in which cognitive functions were divided between one part of the brain that appears to be "speaking" and a second part that listens and obeys—a bicameral mind—and that the breakdown of this division gave rise to consciousness in humans.