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In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom proposed the simulation argument, which suggests that if a civilization becomes capable of creating conscious simulations, it could generate so many simulated beings that a randomly chosen conscious entity would almost certainly be in a simulation.
The following arguments (and the intuitive interpretations of the arguments above) do not directly explain how a Chinese speaking mind could exist in Searle's room, or how the symbols he manipulates could become meaningful. However, by raising doubts about Searle's intuitions they support other positions, such as the system and robot replies.
The argument map tree schema of Kialo with an example path through it: all Con-argument boxes and some Pros were emptied to illustrate an example path. [32] A partial argument tree with claims and impact votes for arguments illustrates one form of collective determination of argument weights that is based on equal-weight user voting. [33]
Book cover of the 1979 paperback edition. Hubert Dreyfus was a critic of artificial intelligence research. In a series of papers and books, including Alchemy and AI, What Computers Can't Do (1972; 1979; 1992) and Mind over Machine, he presented a pessimistic assessment of AI's progress and a critique of the philosophical foundations of the field.
One of the first objections raised by opponents of the Frankfurt-style cases is the two-horned dilemma. This objection was most notably raised by philosophers such as Widerker, Ginet, and Kane. [7] [8] [9] The two-horned dilemma focuses on the connection between the agent's inclination and the agent's decision. This connection can be either ...
The concept of absent qualia is one of two major functionalist objections to the existence of qualia, the other being the inverted spectrum hypothesis. Qualia is a philosophical term used to refer to an individual's subjective experience, that is to say, the way something feels to that individual at that particular moment.
As a result of these arguments and others that build upon them, the dominant theory in philosophy of mind since the 1960s has been a version of non-reductive physicalism based on multiple realizability. [10] In 1988, Hilary Putnam used multiple realizability to argue against functionalism. Noting that functionalism is essentially a watered-down ...
Occasionally, such arguments can be confusing to some people, who perceive a self-contradiction or lack of honesty. [1] Generally speaking, this is a case of mistakenly thinking the argument claims both alternatives are true, when in reality it is claiming only that one or the other of them must be. But arguing in the alternative certainly ...