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The paper provides a theoretical framework that illustrates the role of large shareholders in corporate governance and control. For instance, large shareholders can be crucial in solving agency problems between managers and other shareholders. In addition, they can monitor managers and intervene when necessary in order to protect their profits.
In economic theory, the principal-agent approach (also called agency theory) is part of the field contract theory. [36] [37] In agency theory, it is typically assumed that complete contracts can be written, an assumption also made in mechanism design theory. Hence, there are no restrictions on the class of feasible contractual arrangements ...
"Corporate governance" may be defined, described or delineated in diverse ways, depending on the writer's purpose. Writers focused on a disciplinary interest or context (such as accounting, finance, law, or management) often adopt narrow definitions that appear purpose-specific.
When discussing governance in particular organizations, the quality of governance within the organization is often compared to a standard of good governance. In the case of a business or of a non-profit organization , for example, good governance relates to consistent management, cohesive policies, guidance, processes and decision-rights for a ...
The multiple principal problem, also known as the common agency problem, the multiple accountabilities problem, or the problem of serving two masters, is an extension of the principal-agent problem that explains problems that can occur when one person or entity acts on behalf of multiple other persons or entities. [1]
Because cash flow rights ownership by the CEO and better corporate governance are found to mitigate such behaviour, we interpret the higher pay as evidence of agency problems between shareholders and managers affecting workers' pay. [17] In a very real sense, unions and managers compete to offer benefits to employees. [18]
The Modern Corporation and Private Property is a book written by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means published in 1932 regarding the foundations of United States corporate law.It explores the evolution of big business through a legal and economic lens, and argues that in the modern world those who legally have ownership over companies have been separated from their control.
The history and theory of multistakeholder governance however departs from these models in four ways. The earlier theories describe how a central institution (be it a business, a project, or a government agency) should engage more formally with related institutions (be it other organizations, institutions, or communities).