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Meno (/ ˈ m iː n oʊ /; Ancient Greek: Μένων, Ménōn) is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 385 BC., but set at an earlier date around 402 BC. [1] Meno begins the dialogue by asking Socrates whether virtue (in Ancient Greek: ἀρετή, aretē) can be taught, acquired by practice, or comes by nature. [2]
Here, Socrates aims at the change of Meno's opinion, who was a firm believer in his own opinion and whose claim to knowledge Socrates had disproved. It is essentially the question that begins "post-Socratic" Western philosophy. Socrates begins all wisdom with wondering, thus one must begin with admitting one's ignorance.
Socrates responds: "You will throw me in the water." Whatever Plato does, he will seemingly break his promise. ... Meno's paradox: (Learner's paradox) A man cannot ...
[1] [2] Diogenes Laërtius, citing Favorinus, says that Zeno's teacher Parmenides was the first to introduce the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. But in a later passage, Laërtius attributes the origin of the paradox to Zeno, explaining that Favorinus disagrees. [3] Modern academics attribute the paradox to Zeno. [1] [2]
One such dialogue of Plato's that utilized the Socratic Method was the Meno. The participants were Socrates, Meno, Anytus, and one of Meno's slave boys. The dialogue begins with Meno asking Socrates whether virtue can be taught. Socrates responds by stating that he does not know the definition of virtue.
The companion asks from Socrates to clarify which law he means exactly to which Socrates, somewhat surprised, asks from him whether the law is one or many. More specifically, Socrates asks his companion whether different laws are like parts of gold, with each part being from the same essence as the other, or like stones, with each being separate.
The swamping problem is a problem that appears in the context of epistemology that shows that the idea that knowledge has no additional value over true belief. The problem assumes that knowledge is a true justified belief—the canonical definition—and proceeds to show that knowledge has no more value over true belief by showing that the justification requirement does not add value to the ...
Plato's dialogues that support Socrates's intellectual motivism—as this thesis is named—are mainly the Gorgias (467c–8e, where Socrates discusses the actions of a tyrant that do not benefit him) and Meno (77d–8b, where Socrates explains to Meno his view that no one wants bad things, unless they do not know what is good and bad in the ...