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Constant sum: A game is a constant sum game if the sum of the payoffs to every player are the same for every single set of strategies. In these games, one player gains if and only if another player loses. A constant sum game can be converted into a zero sum game by subtracting a fixed value from all payoffs, leaving their relative order unchanged.
A solved game is a game whose outcome (win, lose or draw) can be correctly predicted from any position, assuming that both players play perfectly.This concept is usually applied to abstract strategy games, and especially to games with full information and no element of chance; solving such a game may use combinatorial game theory or computer assistance.
In game theory, a solution concept is a formal rule for predicting how a game will be played. These predictions are called "solutions", and describe which strategies will be adopted by players and, therefore, the result of the game. The most commonly used solution concepts are equilibrium concepts, most famously Nash equilibrium.
Several variants are considered in Game Theory Evolving by Herbert Gintis. [2] In some variants of the problem, the players are allowed to communicate before deciding to go to the bar. However, they are not required to tell the truth. Named after a bar in Santa Fe, New Mexico, the problem was created in 1994 by W. Brian Arthur.
A Rubinstein bargaining model refers to a class of bargaining games that feature alternating offers through an infinite time horizon. The original proof is due to Ariel Rubinstein in a 1982 paper. [1] For a long time, the solution to this type of game was a mystery; thus, Rubinstein's solution is one of the most influential findings in game theory.
Distribution of the 2898 answers to 1983 tie breaker Jeux et Stratégie contest. Alain Ledoux is the founding father of the "guess 2 / 3 of the average" game. In 1981, Ledoux used this game as a tie breaker in his French magazine Jeux et Stratégie. He asked about 4,000 readers, who reached the same number of points in previous puzzles ...
A classic example of a dynamic game with types is a war game where the player is unsure whether their opponent is a risk-taking "hawk" type or a pacifistic "dove" type. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), which is a solution concept with Bayesian probability for non-turn-based games.
In game theory, fictitious play is a learning rule first introduced by George W. Brown. In it, each player presumes that the opponents are playing stationary (possibly mixed) strategies. In it, each player presumes that the opponents are playing stationary (possibly mixed) strategies.