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  2. Arrow's impossibility theorem - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow's_impossibility_theorem

    Arrow's theorem assumes as background that any non-degenerate social choice rule will satisfy: [15]. Unrestricted domain — the social choice function is a total function over the domain of all possible orderings of outcomes, not just a partial function.

  3. Social Choice and Individual Values - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Choice_and...

    The work culminated in what Arrow called the "General Possibility Theorem," better known thereafter as Arrow's (impossibility) theorem. The theorem states that, absent restrictions on either individual preferences or neutrality of the constitution to feasible alternatives, there exists no social choice rule that satisfies a set of plausible ...

  4. Kenneth Arrow - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Arrow

    Kenneth Joseph Arrow (August 23, 1921 – February 21, 2017) was an American economist, mathematician and political theorist.He received the John Bates Clark Medal in 1957, and the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1972, along with John Hicks.

  5. Social welfare function - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_welfare_function

    Arrow's impossibility theorem is a key result on social welfare functions, showing an important difference between social and consumer choice: whereas it is possible to construct a rational (non-self-contradictory) decision procedure for consumers based only on ordinal preferences, it is impossible to do the same in the social choice setting ...

  6. Unrestricted domain - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrestricted_domain

    Unrestricted domain is one of the conditions for Arrow's impossibility theorem. Under that theorem, it is impossible to have a social choice function that satisfies unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship. However, the conditions of the theorem can be satisfied if unrestricted domain ...

  7. Independence of irrelevant alternatives - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence_of_irrelevant...

    Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that no reasonable (non-random, non-dictatorial) ranked voting system can satisfy IIA. However, Arrow's theorem does not apply to rated voting methods. These can pass IIA under certain assumptions, but fail it if they are not met. Methods that unconditionally pass IIA include sortition and random dictatorship.

  8. Dying To Be Free - The Huffington Post

    projects.huffingtonpost.com/dying-to-be-free...

    The rituals of self-discipline were nothing new. He’d kept a journal since the 8th grade documenting his daily meals and workout routines. As a teenager, he’d woken up to the words of legendary coaches he’d copied from books and taped to his bedroom walls — John Wooden on preparation, Vince Lombardi on sacrifice and Dan Gable on goals.

  9. Dictatorship mechanism - Wikipedia

    en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dictatorship_mechanism

    Dictatorships often crop up as degenerate cases or exceptions to theorems, e.g. Arrow's theorem. If there are at least three alternatives, dictatorship is the only ranked voting rule that satisfies unrestricted domain, Pareto efficiency, and independence of irrelevant alternatives.