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The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, published in 2004, is a book written by James Surowiecki about the aggregation of information in groups, resulting in decisions that, he argues, are often better than could have been made by any single member of the group.
Cultural consensus theory is an approach to information pooling [1] (aggregation, data fusion) which supports a framework for the measurement and evaluation of beliefs as cultural; shared to some extent by a group of individuals. Cultural consensus models guide the aggregation of responses from individuals to estimate (1) the culturally ...
Belief aggregation, [1] also called risk aggregation, [2] opinion aggregation [3] or probabilistic opinion pooling, [4] is a process in which different probability distributions, produced by different experts, are combined to yield a single probability distribution.
Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen for instance, have raised concerns about the methodologies used by prominent democracy indices such as Freedom House and Polity, such as the concept of democracy they measured, the design of indicators, and the aggregation rule. [16]
The aggregation problem is the difficult problem of finding a valid way to treat an empirical or theoretical aggregate as if it reacted like a less-aggregated measure, say, about behavior of an individual agent as described in general microeconomic theory [1] (see representative agent and heterogeneity in economics).
In effect, the Tax Reform Act changed § 163 from a general rule for deduction into one of non-deduction with six discreet exceptions. [3] These exceptions, listed in § 163(h)(2), include exceptions for active business interest, taxable investment interest, passive activity business interest, estate tax interest, and education loan interest ...
The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy is a book published by economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in 1962. It is considered to be one of the classic works from the discipline of public choice in economics and political science.
Nevertheless, it is an empirical question whether the theorem holds in real life or not. Note that the CJT is a double-edged sword: it can either prove that majority rule is an (almost) perfect mechanism to aggregate information, when > /, or an (almost) perfect disaster, when < /. A disaster would mean that the wrong option is chosen ...