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Federalist No. 48 is an essay by James Madison, the forty-eighth of the Federalist Papers. It was first published by The New York Packet on February 1, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. This paper builds on Federalist No. 47. In that essay Madison argued for separation of powers ...
Separation of powers is a political doctrine originating in the writings of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, in which he argued for a constitutional government with three separate branches, each of which would have defined authority to check the powers of the others.
Separation of powers requires a different source of legitimization, or a different act of legitimization from the same source, for each of the separate powers. If the legislative branch appoints the executive and judicial powers, as Montesquieu indicated, there will be no separation or division of its powers, since the power to appoint carries ...
Federalist No. 47 is the forty-seventh paper from The Federalist Papers.It was first published by The New York Packet on January 30, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist Papers were published, but its actual author was James Madison.
The Madisonian model is a structure of government in which the powers of the government are separated into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. This came about because the delegates saw the need to structure the government in such a way to prevent the imposition of tyranny by either majority or minority.
Federalist No. 51 addresses the separation of powers, the federal structure of government and the maintenance of checks and balances by "opposite and rival interests" within the national government. One of Federalist No. 51's most important ideas, an explanation of checks and balances, is the often-quoted phrase, "Ambition must be made to ...
President Andrew Jackson interpreted these clauses as expressly creating a separation of powers among the three branches of the federal government. [1] In contrast, Victoria F. Nourse has argued that the Vesting Clauses do not create the separation of powers, and it actually arises from the representation and appointment clauses elsewhere in ...
The power of the presidency has grown since the 1970s due to key events and to Congress or the Courts not being willing or able to rein in presidential power. [87] With strong incentives to grow their own power, presidents of both parties became natural advocates for the theory [20] and rarely gave up powers exercised by their predecessors. [35]