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In Kantian philosophy, the thing-in-itself (German: Ding an sich) is the status of objects as they are, independent of representation and observation. The concept of the thing-in-itself was introduced by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and over the following centuries was met with controversy among later philosophers. [1]
Transcendental apperception is the uniting and building of coherent consciousness out of different elementary inner experiences (differing in both time and topic, but all belonging to self-consciousness). For example, the experience of "passing of time" relies on this transcendental unity of apperception, according to Kant.
The Rechtsstaat concept is based on the ideas, discovered by Immanuel Kant, for example, in his Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals: "The task of establishing a universal and permanent peaceful life is not only a part of the theory of law within the framework of pure reason, but per se an absolute and ultimate goal. To achieve this goal, a ...
In Kantian philosophy, a transcendental schema (plural: schemata; from Ancient Greek: σχῆμα, 'form, shape, figure') is the procedural rule by which a category or pure, non-empirical concept is associated with a sense impression.
As the sketch closes, the Germans dispute the call. Through the words of the commentator, "Hegel is arguing that reality is merely an a priori adjunct of non-naturalistic ethics , Kant via the categorical imperative is holding that ontologically , it exists only in the imagination and Marx is claiming it was offside ".
Immanuel Kant [a] (born Emanuel Kant; 22 April 1724 – 12 February 1804) was a German philosopher and one of the central Enlightenment thinkers. Born in Königsberg, Kant's comprehensive and systematic works in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics have made him one of the most influential and controversial figures in modern Western philosophy.
Kant uses an example in his refutation of idealism. Idealists believe that objects have no existence independent of the mind. Briefly, Kant shows that: since idealists acknowledge that we have an inner mental life, and; an inner life of self-awareness is bound up with the concepts of objects which are not inner, and which interact causally,
Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysical Elements of Justice; Part I of the Metaphysics of Morals. 1st ed. Translated by John Ladd. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. [introduction and most of part I] Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. In Kant: Political Writings. 2nd enl. ed. Edited by Hans Reiss. Translated by H. B. Nisbet.