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Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters— is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a ...
The question of direct or "naïve" realism, as opposed to indirect or "representational" realism, arises in the philosophy of perception and of mind out of the debate over the nature of conscious experience; [27] [28] the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual ...
Local realism, the view held by the authors of the EPR paper; Logical realism, the conviction the rules of logic are mind-independent; Metaphysical realism; Modal realism; Model-dependent realism (Hawking and Mlodinow) Moderate realism; Moral realism; Naïve realism; New realism (philosophy) Ontic structural realism; Peircean realism ...
Constructive realism is a branch of philosophy, specifically the philosophy of science. It was developed in the late 1950s by Jane Loevinger and elaborated in the 1980s by Friedrich Wallner (also Fritz Wallner) in Vienna. In his paper abstract on constructive realism, Wallner describes it as follows:
Direct realism, also known as naïve realism, argues we perceive the world directly. In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences; [1] [2] out of the metaphysical question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself ...
Aesthetic Realism is a philosophy founded in 1941 by the American poet and critic Eli Siegel (1902–1978). [1] He defined it as a three-part study: "[T]hese three divisions can be described as: One, Liking the world; Two, The opposites; Three, The meaning of contempt."
Entity realism (also selective realism), [1] sometimes equated with referential realism, [2] is a philosophical position within the debate about scientific realism. It is a variation of realism (independently proposed by Stanford School philosophers Nancy Cartwright and Ian Hacking in 1983) that restricts warranted belief to only certain entities.
Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.