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Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (/ ˈ v ɪ t ɡ ən ʃ t aɪ n,-s t aɪ n / VIT-gən-s(h)tyne, [7] Austrian German: [ˈluːdvɪk ˈjoːsɛf ˈjoːhan ˈvɪtɡn̩ʃtaɪn]; 26 April 1889 – 29 April 1951) was an Austrian philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
[1] [2] Wittgenstein compared the concept of logical pictures (German: Bilder) with spatial pictures. [3] The picture theory of language is considered a correspondence theory of truth. [4] Wittgenstein claims there is an unbridgeable gap between what can be expressed in language and what can only be expressed in non-verbal ways.
Philosophical Investigations (German: Philosophische Untersuchungen) is a work by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, published posthumously in 1953.. Philosophical Investigations is divided into two parts, consisting of what Wittgenstein calls, in the preface, Bemerkungen, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe as "remarks".
The rabbit–duck illusion is an ambiguous image in which a rabbit or a duck can be seen. [1] The earliest known version is an unattributed drawing from the 23 October 1892 issue of Fliegende Blätter, a German humour magazine. It was captioned, in older German spelling, "Welche Thiere gleichen einander am meisten?
Although language differs from pictures in lacking direct pictorial mode of representation (e.g., it does not use colors and shapes to represent colors and shapes), still Wittgenstein believed that propositions are logical pictures of the world by virtue of sharing logical form with the reality which they represent (TLP 2.18–2.2).
In philosophy, Wittgenstein's ladder is a metaphor set out by Ludwig Wittgenstein about learning. In what may be a deliberate reference to Søren Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, [1] [2] the penultimate proposition of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (translated from the original German) reads: [3]
Wittgenstein's Private Language: Grammar, Nonsense, and Imagination in Philosophical Investigations, §§ 243–315. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-19-955674-8; Nielsen, Keld Stehr (2008). The evolution of the private language argument. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-7546-5629-6. Wittgenstein, Ludwig (2001) [1953].
However, Wittgenstein took the line that 'There is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there are phenomenological problems.' [5] He was content to regard Goethe's observations as a kind of logic or geometry. Wittgenstein took some of his examples from the Runge letter included at the end of the "Farbenlehre", e.g. "White is the lightest ...