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Bernard Brodie (May 20, 1910 – November 24, 1978) was an American military strategist well known for establishing the basics of nuclear strategy. [1] Known as "the American Clausewitz," and "the original nuclear strategist," he was an initial architect of nuclear deterrence strategy and tried to ascertain the role and value of nuclear weapons after their creation.
The Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) was the United States' general plan for nuclear war from 1961 to 2003. The SIOP gave the President of the United States a range of targeting options, and described launch procedures and target sets against which nuclear weapons would be launched.
of the world’s nuclear weapons would also work together to bring all the nuclear weapons countries to the negotiating table for the first in history multilateral negotiations to limit nuclear arms. These illustrative next steps are possible and desirable for five basic reasons. First, mutual nuclear deterrence based on the threat of
As a sub-branch of military strategy, nuclear strategy attempts to match nuclear weapons as means to political ends. In addition to the actual use of nuclear weapons whether in the battlefield or strategically, a large part of nuclear strategy involves their use as a bargaining tool. Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is a process “to determine what the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy should be.” [1] NPRs are the primary document for determining U.S. strategy for nuclear weapons and it outlines an overview of U.S. nuclear capabilities, changes to current stockpiles and capabilities, plans for deterrence, and plans for arms control policy with other nations.
This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties under the terms of Title 17, Chapter 1, Section 105 of the US Code.
The Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations is a U.S. Department of Defense document publicly discovered in 2005 on the circumstances under which commanders of U.S. forces could request the use of nuclear weapons. The document was a draft being revised to be consistent with the Bush doctrine of preemptive attack. [1]
Analyzing U.S. nuclear strategy, Schlesinger noted that the policies developed in the 1950s and 1960s were based on an overwhelming U.S. lead in nuclear forces. The plans focussed on doing as much damage to the USSR and its allies as possible, regardless of the actions the Soviets might take in response.