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Bob, concerned that Alice's private key may have been compromised, creates an 'OCSP request' that contains Alice's certificate serial number and sends it to Carol. Carol's OCSP responder reads the certificate serial number from Bob's request. The OCSP responder uses the certificate serial number to look up the revocation status of Alice's ...
The only increased risk of OCSP stapling is that the notification of revocation for a certificate may be delayed until the last-signed OCSP response expires. As a result, clients continue to have verifiable assurance from the certificate authority that the certificate is presently valid (or was quite recently), but no longer need to ...
Browsers and other relying parties might use CRLs, or might use alternate certificate revocation technologies (such as OCSP) [4] [5] or CRLSets (a dataset derived from CRLs [6]) to check certificate revocation status. Note that OCSP is falling out of favor due to privacy and performance concerns. [7] [8] [9] Subscribers and other parties can ...
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) allows clients to interactively ask a server (an OCSP responder) about a certificate's status, receiving a response that is cryptographically authenticated by the issuing CA. [29] It was designed to address issues with CRLs. [30] A typical OCSP response is less than 1 kB. [31]
It must be continuously updated with current CRL information from a certificate authority which issued the certificates contained within the CRL. While this is a potentially labor-intensive process, the use of a dedicated validation authority allows for dynamic validation of certificates issued by an offline root certificate authority. While ...
X.509 and RFC 5280 also include standards for certificate revocation list (CRL) implementations. Another IETF-approved way of checking a certificate's validity is the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Firefox 3.0 enabled OCSP checking by default, as did versions of Windows from at least Vista and later. [9]
In December 2021, RFC 9162 "Certificate Transparency Version 2.0" was published. [1] Version 2.0 includes major changes to the required structure of the log certificate, as well as support for Ed25519 as a signature algorithm of SCTs and support for including certificate inclusion proofs with the SCT.
Without revocation, an attacker would be able to exploit such a compromised or misissued certificate until expiry. [31] Hence, revocation is an important part of a public key infrastructure. [32] Revocation is performed by the issuing CA, which produces a cryptographically authenticated statement of revocation. [33]