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Malcolm was also a defender of a modal version of the ontological argument. In 1960 he argued that the argument originally presented by Anselm of Canterbury in the second chapter of his Proslogion was just an inferior version of the argument propounded in chapter three.
A more recent ontological argument came from Kurt Gödel, who proposed a formal argument for God's existence. Norman Malcolm also revived the ontological argument in 1960 when he located a second, stronger ontological argument in Anselm's work; Alvin Plantinga challenged this argument and proposed an alternative, based on modal logic.
Plantinga has expressed a modal logic version of the ontological argument in which he uses modal logic to develop, in a more rigorous and formal way, Norman Malcolm's and Charles Hartshorne's modal ontological arguments. Plantinga criticized Malcolm's and Hartshorne's arguments, and offered an alternative. [48] He argued that, if Malcolm does ...
In The Only Possible Argument, Kant questions both the ontological argument for God (as proposed by Saint Anselm) and the argument from design. Kant argues that the internal possibility of all things presupposes some existence: [1] Accordingly, there must be something whose nonexistence would cancel all internal possibility whatsoever.
More recently, individuals such as Kurt Gödel, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm, and Alvin Plantinga have proposed ontological arguments, many of which elaborate on or are connected to older ontological arguments presented by individuals such as St. Anselm, Descartes, and Leibniz. [11]
Various philosophers – including Norman Malcolm, Peter Winch, D. Z. Phillips, and Rush Rhees – have interpreted Wittgenstein as advocating a kind of fideism regarding religion. Such a fideism would imply that religious statements are only meaningful within a religious form of life and thus cannot be criticized from outside religion.
In philosophy, metaphysical necessity, sometimes called broad logical necessity, [1] is one of many different kinds of necessity, which sits between logical necessity and nomological (or physical) necessity, in the sense that logical necessity entails metaphysical necessity, but not vice versa, and metaphysical necessity entails physical necessity, but not vice versa.
Apparently at the instigation of his close friend Norman Malcolm in mid-1949, Wittgenstein began to draft his response on loose sheets, probably while staying in Vienna in late 1949 and early 1950. He returned to the subject twice more before a fourth and final, highly energetic six week period immediately before his death, when more than half ...