Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
The subgame perfect equilibrium in addition to the Nash equilibrium requires that the strategy also is a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of that game. This eliminates all non-credible threats , that is, strategies that contain non-rational moves in order to make the counter-player change their strategy.
Defection always results in a better payoff than cooperation, so it is a strictly dominant strategy for both players. Mutual defection is the only strong Nash equilibrium in the game. Since the collectively ideal result of mutual cooperation is irrational from a self-interested standpoint, this Nash equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.
Finding Nash equilibrium in a game takes exponential time in the size of the representation. If the graphical representation of the game is a tree, we can find the equilibrium in polynomial time. In the general case, where the maximal degree of a node is 3 or more, the problem is NP-complete.
The solutions are normally based on the concept of Nash equilibrium, and these solutions are reached by using methods listed in Solution concept. Most solutions used in non-cooperative game are refinements developed from Nash equilibrium , including the minimax mixed-strategy proved by John von Neumann .
The mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is inefficient: the players will miscoordinate with probability 13/25, leaving each player with an expected return of 6/5 (less than the payoff of 2 from each's less favored pure strategy equilibrium). It remains unclear how expectations would form that would result in a particular equilibrium being played out.
In game theory, the best response is the strategy (or strategies) which produces the most favorable outcome for a player, taking other players' strategies as given. [1] The concept of a best response is central to John Nash's best-known contribution, the Nash equilibrium, the point at which each player in a game has selected the best response (or one of the best responses) to the other players ...
Further, it is possible for a game to have a Nash equilibrium that is resilient against coalitions less than a specified size k. CPNE is related to the theory of the core. Confusingly, the concept of a strong Nash equilibrium is unrelated to that of a weak Nash equilibrium. That is, a Nash equilibrium can be both strong and weak, either, or ...
The decision of each player can be viewed as determining two angles. Symmetric Nash equilibria that attain a payoff value of / for each player is shown, and each player volunteers at this Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, these Nash equilibria are Pareto optimal. It is shown that the payoff function of Nash equilibria in the quantum setting is ...