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One reason why the secretary problem has received so much attention is that the optimal policy for the problem (the stopping rule) is simple and selects the single best candidate about 37% of the time, irrespective of whether there are 100 or 100 million applicants.
Optimal stopping problems can be found in areas of statistics, economics, and mathematical finance (related to the pricing of American options). A key example of an optimal stopping problem is the secretary problem .
Linear-quadratic regulator — system dynamics is a linear differential equation, objective is quadratic; Linear-quadratic-Gaussian control (LQG) — system dynamics is a linear SDE with additive noise, objective is quadratic Optimal projection equations — method for reducing dimension of LQG control problem
[2] 37 is the smallest non-supersingular prime in moonshine theory. 37 is also an emirp because it remains prime when its digits are reversed. The secretary problem is also known as the 37% rule, since 1 e ≈ 37 % {\displaystyle {\tfrac {1}{e}}\approx 37\%} .
An optimal approval vote always votes for the most preferred candidate and not for the least preferred candidate, which is a dominant strategy. An optimal vote can require supporting one candidate and not voting for a more preferred candidate if there 4 candidates or more, e.g. the third and fourth choices are correlated to gain or lose ...
Based on the Gordon-Loeb model, the company’s security investment should not exceed €120,000 × 0.37 = €44,000. The model was first introduced by Lawrence A. Gordon and Martin P. Loeb in a 2002 paper published in ACM Transactions on Information and System Security , titled "The Economics of Information Security Investment". [ 1 ]
Although the term "optimization" is derived from "optimum", [2] achieving a truly optimal system is rare in practice, which is referred to as superoptimization.Optimization typically focuses on improving a system with respect to a specific quality metric rather than making it universally optimal.
Regulatory capture is the process through which a regulatory agency, created to act in the public interest, instead advances the commercial or special concerns of interest groups that dominate the industry it is meant to regulate. [2]