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The void for vagueness doctrine derives from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. That is, vague laws unconstitutionally deprive people of their rights without due process. The following pronouncement of the void for vagueness doctrine was made by Justice Sutherland in Connally v.
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The Ninth Circuit, in Lawson v.Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362 (1981), had additionally held that Penal Code §647(e) violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures because it "subverts the probable cause requirement" by authorizing arrest for conduct that is no more than suspicious.
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court abortion rights case, which held void for vagueness part of Pennsylvania's 1974 Abortion Control Act.
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court expanded and established key constructs of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process doctrine along with establishing the vagueness doctrine.
Under the Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (added June 17, 1992), loitering was a crime. The facts of the case were: Chicago’s Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibit[ed] "criminal street gang members" from loitering in public places.
Jacksonville's ordinance at the time of the defendants' arrests and conviction was the following: [2] Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling ...
The Court had raised the specter of unconstitutional vagueness in two prior cases regarding the residual clause—James v. United States and Sykes v. United States —that "honed in on the imprecision of the phrase 'serious potential risk'".