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The Heinz dilemma is a frequently used example in many ethics and morality classes. One well-known version of the dilemma, used in Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, is stated as follows: [1]
A related field is the ethics of artificial intelligence, which addresses such problems as the existence of moral personhood of AIs, the possibility of moral obligations to AIs (for instance, the right of a possibly sentient computer system to not be turned off), and the question of making AIs that behave ethically towards humans and others.
He also felt that Trotsky overlooked practical questions related to socialism as a goal and an action in his essays. Yet, Serge shared some agreement with Trotsky about the hypocritical nature of conventional morality in religious and intellectual circles and that class struggles rather than individual sentiments shaped the conditions of the ...
In philosophy, an ethical dilemma, also called an ethical paradox or moral dilemma, is a situation in which two or more conflicting moral imperatives, none of which overrides the other, confront an agent. A closely related definition characterizes an ethical dilemma as a situation in which every available choice is wrong.
Moral paradox: A situation in which moral imperatives clash without clear resolution. Outcomes paradox : Schizophrenia patients in developing countries seem to fare better than their Western counterparts.
The Elf Ecthelion slays the Orc champion Orcobal in Gondolin. 2007 illustration by Tom Loback. J. R. R. Tolkien, a devout Roman Catholic, [T 1] created what he came to feel was a moral dilemma for himself with his supposedly evil Middle-earth peoples like Orcs, when he made them able to speak.
A similar view is defended by G. E. Moore's open-question argument, intended to refute any identification of moral properties with natural properties, which is asserted by ethical naturalists, who do not deem the naturalistic fallacy a fallacy. The is–ought problem is closely related to the fact–value distinction in epistemology.
Hume defends his sympathy-based moral sentimentalism by claiming that, contrary to moral rationalism, we can never make moral judgments based on reason alone.Reason deals with facts and draws conclusions from them, but, all else being equal, it could not lead us to choose one option over the other; only our sentiments can do this, according to Hume.