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Aristotle says rhetoric is the counterpart (antistrophe) of dialectic. [1]: I.1.1–2 He explains the similarities between the two but fails to comment on the differences. Here he introduces the term enthymeme. [1]: I.1.3 Chapter Two Aristotle defines rhetoric as the ability in a particular case to see the available means of persuasion.
The structure of Rhetoric to Alexander is quite similar to that of Aristotle's work. [4] Chapters 1-5 deal with arguments specific to each of the species of rhetoric corresponding to the first book of Aristotle's work. Chapters 6-22 are about "uses" what Aristotle calls "topics", discussing them in the latter part of his second book.
For Plato and Aristotle, dialectic involves persuasion, so when Aristotle says that rhetoric is the antistrophe of dialectic, he means that rhetoric as he uses the term has a domain or scope of application that is parallel to, but different from, the domain or scope of application of dialectic. Claude Pavur explains that "[t]he Greek prefix ...
The works of Aristotle, sometimes referred to by modern scholars with the Latin phrase Corpus Aristotelicum, is the collection of Aristotle's works that have survived from antiquity. According to a distinction that originates with Aristotle himself, his writings are divisible into two groups: the " exoteric " and the " esoteric ". [ 1 ]
Deliberative rhetoric (Greek: γένος συμβουλευτικόν, genos symbouleutikon; Latin: genus deliberativum; sometimes called legislative oratory) is one of the three kinds of rhetoric described by Aristotle. Deliberative rhetoric juxtaposes potential future outcomes to communicate support or opposition for a given action or policy. [1]
The modes of persuasion, modes of appeal or rhetorical appeals (Greek: pisteis) are strategies of rhetoric that classify a speaker's or writer's appeal to their audience. These include ethos, pathos, and logos, all three of which appear in Aristotle's Rhetoric. [1]
In his treatise Topics, Aristotle does not explicitly define topic, though it is "at least primarily a strategy for argument not infrequently justified or explained by a principle". [2] He characterises it in the Rhetoric [3] thus: "I call the same thing element and topic; for an element or a topic is a heading under which many enthymemes fall."
Hence, rhetorical reason is a modality of phronesis and also, as Aristotle famously notes, a counterpart of dialectic. That is, it depends upon practical wisdom for its proper work, and, in that work, it operates much like dialectical inference, only its proper domain is the particular case as opposed to the general question.