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CRL for a revoked cert of Verisign CA. There are two different states of revocation defined in RFC 5280: Revoked A certificate is irreversibly revoked if, for example, it is discovered that the certificate authority (CA) had improperly issued a certificate, or if a private-key is thought to have been compromised.
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) is an Internet protocol used for obtaining the revocation status of an X.509 digital certificate. [2] It is described in RFC 6960 and is on the Internet standards track.
Certificate revocation lists are too bandwidth-costly for routine use, and the Online Certificate Status Protocol presents connection latency and privacy issues. Other schemes have been proposed but have not yet been successfully deployed to enable fail-hard checking.
X.509 and RFC 5280 also include standards for certificate revocation list (CRL) implementations. Another IETF-approved way of checking a certificate's validity is the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). Firefox 3.0 enabled OCSP checking by default, as did versions of Windows from at least Vista and later. [9]
The Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) stapling, formally known as the TLS Certificate Status Request extension, is a standard for checking the revocation status of X.509 digital certificates. [1]
Without revocation, an attacker would be able to exploit such a compromised or misissued certificate until expiry. [31] Hence, revocation is an important part of a public key infrastructure. [32] Revocation is performed by the issuing CA, which produces a cryptographically authenticated statement of revocation. [33]
PKCS #7 files may be stored both as raw DER format or as PEM format. PEM format is the same as DER format but wrapped inside Base64 encoding and sandwiched in between ‑‑‑‑‑BEGIN PKCS7‑‑‑‑‑ and ‑‑‑‑‑END PKCS7‑‑‑‑‑. Windows uses the .p7b file name extension [6] for both these encodings.
Certificate revocation lists are too bandwidth-costly for routine use, and the Online Certificate Status Protocol presents connection latency and privacy issues. Other schemes have been proposed but have not yet been successfully deployed to enable fail-hard checking. [32]