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In his original paper outlining the hard problem of consciousness, Chalmers discussed GWT as a theory that only targets one of the "easy problems" of consciousness. [1] In particular, he said GWT provided a promising account of how information in the brain could become globally accessible, but argued that "now the question arises in a different ...
Sufficiently more evolved is the second layer of Damasio's theory, Core Consciousness. This emergent process occurs when an organism becomes consciously aware of feelings associated with changes occurring to its internal bodily state; it is able to recognize that its thoughts are its own, and that they are formulated in its own perspective. [1]
The information integration theory of consciousness (IITC) shares with the DCH the idea that conscious experiences provide informative discriminations among a vast repertoire of possible experiences. In the IITC, the quantity phi is defined as the information that is integrated across the informational "weakest link" of a system.
Max Velmans proposed that the "everyday understanding of consciousness" uncontroversially "refers to experience itself rather than any particular thing that we observe or experience" and he added that consciousness "is [therefore] exemplified by all the things that we observe or experience", [31]: 4 whether thoughts, feelings, or perceptions.
Phi; the symbol used for integrated information. Integrated information theory (IIT) proposes a mathematical model for the consciousness of a system. It comprises a framework ultimately intended to explain why some physical systems (such as human brains) are conscious, [1] and to be capable of providing a concrete inference about whether any physical system is conscious, to what degree, and ...
Just as he argues that there is no particular reason why particular macroscopic physical features in the brain should give rise to consciousness, he also thinks that there is no particular reason why a particular quantum feature, such as the EM field in the brain, should give rise to consciousness either.
Like a number of other theories, the Multiple Drafts model understands conscious experience as taking time to occur, such that percepts do not instantaneously arise in the mind in their full richness. The distinction is that Dennett's theory denies any clear and unambiguous boundary separating conscious experiences from all other processing.
While neural processes in the brain involve electrochemical interactions among neurons, the subjective experience of consciousness arises from these processes in a way that is not directly reducible to them. This emergence of conscious experience from neural substrates is a central topic in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. [16]