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The Borda count is used for certain political elections in Slovenia and the Micronesian nation of Kiribati. A similar rule is used in Nauru. In Slovenia, the Borda count is used to elect two of the ninety members of the National Assembly: one member represents a constituency of ethnic Italians, the other a constituency of the Hungarian minority.
Borda count is a voting system in which voters rank the candidates in an order of preference. Points are given for the position of a candidate in a voter's rank order. The candidate with the most points wins. The Borda count does not comply with the Condorcet criterion in the following case.
The Borda count is a weighted-rank system that assigns scores to each candidate based on their position in each ballot. If m is the total number of candidates, the candidate ranked first on a ballot receives m − 1 points, the second receives m − 2, and so on, until the last-ranked candidate who receives zero.
This method is more favourable to candidates with many first preferences than the conventional Borda count. It has been described as a system "somewhere between plurality and the Borda count, but as veering more towards plurality". [5] Simulations show that 30% of Nauru elections would produce different outcomes if counted using standard Borda ...
k-Borda: each voter gives, to each committee member, his Borda count. Each voter ranks the candidates and the rankings are scored together. The k candidates with the highest total Borda score are elected. Borda-Chamberlin-Courant (BCC): each voter gives, to each committee, the Borda count of his most preferred candidate in the committee. [12]
Compliant methods include: two-round system, instant-runoff voting (AV), contingent vote, borda count, Schulze method, ranked pairs, and Kemeny-Young method.Any voting method that ends in a runoff passes the criterion, so long as all voters are able to express their preferences in that runoff i.e. STAR voting passes only when voters can always indicate their ranked preference in their scores ...
The Borda count and Bucklin voting both elect C in the scenario above, and thus fail IIA after A is removed. Copeland's method returns a three-way tie, but can be shown to fail IIA by going in the opposite direction. If A were not a candidate, then B would win outright. Introducing A changes the outcome into a three-way tie.
Some systems, and the Borda count in particular, are vulnerable when the distribution of candidates is displaced relative to the distribution of voters. The attached table shows the accuracy of the Borda count (as a percentage) when an infinite population of voters satisfies a univariate Gaussian distribution and m candidates are drawn from a ...