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Virtue ethics (also aretaic ethics, [a] [1] from Greek ἀρετή []) is a philosophical approach that treats virtue and character as the primary subjects of ethics, in contrast to other ethical systems that put consequences of voluntary acts, principles or rules of conduct, or obedience to divine authority in the primary role.
According to Ross, self-evident intuition shows that there are four kinds of things that are intrinsically good: pleasure, knowledge, virtue and justice. [1] [4] "Virtue" refers to actions or dispositions to act from the appropriate motives, for example, from the desire to do one's duty. [2] "Justice", on the other hand, is about happiness in ...
His poem Psychomachia depicts a battle between female personifications of virtues and vices, with each virtue confronting and defeating a particular vice. [9] However, Prudentius did not base his allegory on the cardinal and theological virtues, nor did he use the traditional list of capital vices. The combatants in the Psychomachia are as follows:
In human practical ethics, a virtue is a disposition to choose actions that succeed in showing high moral standards: doing what is said to be right and avoiding what is wrong in a given field of endeavour, even when doing so may be unnecessary from a utilitarian perspective. When someone takes pleasure in doing what is right, even when it is ...
Jesuit scholars Daniel J. Harrington and James F. Keenan, in their Paul and Virtue Ethics (2010), argue for seven "new virtues" to replace the classical cardinal virtues in complementing the three theological virtues, mirroring the seven earlier proposed in Bernard Lonergan's Method in Theology (1972): "be humble, be hospitable, be merciful, be ...
In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, chapter 6: "Virtue (arete), then, is a habit or trained faculty of choice, the characteristic of which lies in moderation or observance of the mean relatively to the persons concerned, as determined by reason, i.e., by the reason by which the prudent man would determine it." [14]
In Aristotle’s work, phronesis is the intellectual virtue that helps turn one’s moral instincts into practical action [4] by inculcating the practical know-how to translate virtue in thought into concrete successful action and this will produce phronimos by being able to weigh up the most integral parts of various virtues and competing ...
Like courage, temperance is a virtue concerning our discipline of "the irrational parts of our nature" (fear, in the case of courage; desire, in the case of temperance). [3]: III.10 His discussion is found in the Nicomachean Ethics Book III, chapters 10–12, and concludes in this way: