Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
Hume's fork is the idea that all items of knowledge are based either on logic and definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then "ought" statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. Moral skepticism and non-cognitivism work with such conclusions.
The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume. [3] The terms are often used interchangeably, though philosophical discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics. [4]
Fallacy of accent – changing the meaning of a statement by not specifying on which word emphasis falls. Persuasive definition – purporting to use the "true" or "commonly accepted" meaning of a term while, in reality, using an uncommon or altered definition. (cf. the if-by-whiskey fallacy)
ought – the "is" and "ought" problem involves terms that go back to Kant, Hume, and others. Kelsen preferred the ought (Sollen) or an ought proposition (Sollsatz) to norm because of the latter's dual sense of both descriptive (e.g., some behavior "is the norm", which Kelsen does not use) and prescriptive social norms. [7]
Albert Einstein was a great admirer of Hume and remarked in a letter to Moritz Schlick that he had read Hume's book and the works of Ernst Mach "with eagerness and admiration shortly before finding relativity theory" and that "very possibly, I wouldn't have come to the solution without those philosophical studies". [8]
Then he tackles related problems of methodology, the "Is-Ought" test, the "Mixed Question" test, as well as including incidental examinations of Popper, Heisenberg, James, etc., and reserving three chapters for the glories and fallacies of Ancient, Medieval and post-Cartesian philosophy. [1]
The term naturalistic fallacy is sometimes used to label the problematic inference of an ought from an is (the is–ought problem). [3] Michael Ridge relevantly elaborates that "[t]he intuitive idea is that evaluative conclusions require at least one evaluative premise—purely factual premises about the naturalistic features of things do not entail or even support evaluative conclusions."
Typically, a deontic logic uses OA to mean it is obligatory that A (or it ought to be (the case) that A), and PA to mean it is permitted (or permissible) that A, which is defined as . In natural language, the statement "You may go to the zoo OR the park" should be understood as P z ∧ P p {\displaystyle Pz\land Pp} instead of P z ∨ P p ...