Search results
Results from the WOW.Com Content Network
He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism. Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his ...
The term panpsychism comes from the Greek pan (πᾶν: "all, everything, whole") and psyche (ψυχή: "soul, mind"). [7]: 1 The use of "psyche" is controversial because it is synonymous with "soul", a term usually taken to refer to something supernatural; more common terms now found in the literature include mind, mental properties, mental aspect, and experience.
Though Chalmers believes neutral monism and panpsychism ought to be taken seriously, he considers the combination problem to be point of concern. He considers Russell's solution of "protophenominal properties" to be ad hoc, and thinks such speculation undercuts the parsimony that made neutral monism initially appealing.
Chalmers describes his overall view as "naturalistic dualism", [1] but he says panpsychism is in a sense a form of physicalism, [52] as does Strawson. [118] Proponents of panpsychism argue it solves the hard problem of consciousness parsimoniously by making consciousness a fundamental feature of reality. [43] [119]
Chalmers believes that an adequate theory of consciousness can only come by solving both the hard and easy problems. On top of discovering brain states associated with conscious experience, science must also discover why and how certain brain states are accompanied by experience. [6] This is what Chalmers attempts to do in The Conscious Mind.
Later, he suggested that while the causal component could be separated, interactionism was like "type-F monism" (Russellian monism, panpsychism, and panprotopsychism) in that it gave entities externally characterized by physical relationships the additional intrinsic feature of conscious properties. [7]
"Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" (1995) - David Chalmers "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism" (2006) - Galen Strawson "Illusionism as the Obvious Default Theory of Consciousness" (2016) - Daniel Dennett "The Meta Problem of Consciousness" (2018) - David Chalmers "The Real Problem(s) with Panpsychism" (2021) - Anil Seth
David Chalmers argues against quantum consciousness. He instead discusses how quantum mechanics may relate to dualistic consciousness. [61] Chalmers is skeptical that any new physics can resolve the hard problem of consciousness. [62] [63] [64] He argues that quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same weakness as more conventional ...