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Range voting (also called score voting or utilitarian voting) implements the relative-utilitarian rule by letting voters explicitly express their utilities to each alternative on a common normalized scale. Implicit utilitarian voting tries to approximate the utilitarian rule while letting the voters express only ordinal rankings over candidates.
Rule utilitarianism is a form of utilitarianism that says an action is right as it conforms to a rule that leads to the greatest good, or that "the rightness or wrongness of a particular action is a function of the correctness of the rule of which it is an instance". [1]
However, it is not clear that this distinction is made in the academic literature. It has been argued that rule utilitarianism collapses into act utilitarianism, because for any given rule, in the case where breaking the rule produces more utility, the rule can be refined by the addition of a sub-rule that handles cases like the exception. [56]
Implicit utilitarian voting attempts to approximate score voting or the utilitarian rule, even in situations where cardinal utilities are unavailable. The main challenge of implicit utilitarian voting is that rankings do not contain enough information to calculate exact utilities, meaning that maximizing social welfare in all cases is impossible.
This is an incomplete list of advocates of utilitarianism and/or consequentialism This is a dynamic list and may never be able to satisfy particular standards for completeness. You can help by adding missing items with reliable sources .
The goal of Thiele's methods is to find a committee W that maximizes the total satisfaction (following the utilitarian rule). The results obviously depend on the function f. Without loss of generality, we can normalize f such that f(0)=0 and f(1)=1. Thiele claims that the selection of f should depend on the purpose of the elections: [2]: Sec.4
The utilitarian rule is a special case where f(x)=x, and the Nash rule is a special case where f(x)=log(x). Every f-maximizing rule is PE, and has the following additional properties: [1]: Prop.5, 6, 7 If f is any concave function of log, then it guarantees Individual-FS.
An example function is the utilitarian rule, which says "give the item to a person that values it the most". We denote a social choice function by Soc and its recommended outcome given a set of preferences by Soc(Prefs). A mechanism is a rule that maps a set of individual actions to a social outcome.